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Abstract
We consider agents who do not have any information about others’ preferences.
In this situation they attempt to behave such as to maximize their chances to ob-
tain their most preferred alternative. This deﬁnes a solution concept for games
symmetrical to Barber` a and Dutta’s protective equilibrium, the demanding equi-
librium. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for self implementation in demanding
equilibria (s.i.d.e.) of social choice functions are provided.
1 Introduction
In implementation theory one takes as given a social choice function or correspondence
which gives for any situation those social alternatives that are desirable according to
some criteria. Given that it may be impossible for a social planner, to directly use
all data about a given situation he needs to determine the outcomes, be it for lack
of information, or because such information is not veriﬁable, the objective then is to
design a mechanism to implement the social choice rule under consideration. Diﬀerent
approaches are possible with regard to the informational assumptions among the agents,
to the solution concept employed in the implementation, and further restrictions put on
the mechanism. With respect to the latter point, often direct mechanisms are considered,
for which agents’ message spaces in the mechanism coincide with the space of those
characteristics they have private knowledge about. Furthermore, often some notion of
simplicity of the mechanism is invoked. Since any social choice function can itself be
interpreted as a direct mechanism, one could consider this the most natural one to be
used for implementation, where the problem becomes to check whether one gets positive
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results using some appropriate equilibrium concept. This is termed self-implementation
by Barber` a and Dutta (cf. [4]): Agents are asked to report their characteristics (so the
mechanism is direct), and then the mechanism carries out what the social choice rule
prescribes for the reported data.
Another reason to take such an approach lies in the fact that in some areas it is well
known that the ideal social choice rule does not exist. In voting theory, for example,
the results of Arrow, Gibbard and Satterthwaite (cf. [1, 10, 24]) tell us, that there
are no voting rules satisfying a list of desirable (and seemingly innocent) requirements.
Therefore, the voting rules considered in the literature in themselves already are an
attempt to do as well as possible in the given limits. In this sense, voting rules already
have the character of a mechanism rather than just being a normative prescription of
the socially desirable outcomes. Hence, it may not seem very convincing to come up
with yet another mechanism to implement these rules.
In this line of thinking, Barber` a and Dutta [2, 3, 4] present results on social choice rules
which are self implementable in an equilibrium concept they call protective equilibrium,
which is based on an extreme type of risk-aversion of agents faced with decisions under
complete ignorance. This type of behavior has been characterized by Barber` aa n d
Jackson [6] and has been used elsewhere in matching models (Barber` a and Dutta [5])
as well as in game theory (Fiestra-Janeiro, Borm and van Mergen [9]).
One motivation for this paper lies in the fact that in the realm of voting rules, while the
antiplurality rule turns out to be self implementable in protective equilibrium, such is not
the case for the plurality rule.1 Given that the latter is much more widely used, we felt
it would be of interest to consider an alternative behavioral assumption which would
support the plurality rule as being self implementable. This is demanding behavior,
the characterization of which can be obtained by re placing a convexity (risk-aversion)
axiom in the characterization of protective behavior by concavity (risk-loving) as has
been demonstrated by Naeve [17]. This intuition is further supported by the fact that
each characterization of the plurality rule has its counterpart for the antiplurality rule,
and vice versa. This generic result has been highlighted by Saari [19, 21, 22], who
remarked that reversal symmetry governs the mirror behavior between these two voting
rules.
This paper should be viewed as part of a more general research project. The Gibbard
and Satterthwaite ([10, 24]) impossibility result for choice functions is based upon the
concept of Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, in certain contexts one may argue that the
behavior of the agents is governed by a diﬀerent logic. This is precisely the line of
inquiry followed by Barber` a and Dutta who studied, with the concept of protective
equilibrium, voting situations where the agents have no information at all about other
agents’ preferences and only use “protective” strategies of a lexical maximin type. As
a consequence of their results, the use of the antiplurality rule as a democratic self im-
plementable mechanism could be recommended in environments where their behavioral
assumptions are fulﬁlled. Several other positive results in the literature make a similar
1For a formal deﬁnition of both rules as special cases of scoring rules see 6.1 below.Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 3
connection between reasonable voting rules and game theoretic solution concepts which
capture certain types of rationality for the agents. Without being exhaustive, we could
mention Moulin’s results, for the positional rules and the concept of sophisticated voting
[15], Dutta and Sen’s for the Condorcet social choice functions and backward induction
[8] or, more recently, Sanver and Sertel [27], who characterized the outcomes one gets
by considering the strong Nash equilibria of mechanisms the outcome functions of which
are voting rules. Thus, a possible interpretation of our results could be a justiﬁcation
of the use of the plurality rule in decision contexts where all the agents are risk-lovers
and have no information about the other agents’ behavior.
As most of the results are symmetrical to Barber` a and Dutta’s, the organization of
the paper is similar to their Implementability via Protective Equilibria [3]. After having
introduced the basic setup in Section 2, Section 3 presents the concept of self implemen-
tation in demanding equilibria and the ﬁrst theorem about truthful revelation. Next,
four necessary and suﬃcient conditions for implementation of social choice correspon-
dences are proposed in Section 4. As one may guess, these axioms are mirror conditions
o ft h eo n e su s e db yB a r b e r ` a and Dutta for the characterization of choice functions which
are directly implementable via protective equilibria (d.i.p.e.).2 Section 5 presents eight
choice functions that serve to prove the independence of the four axioms. In the follow-
ing Section 6, we give several examples of voting rules that are s.i.d.e.. The connection
of Barber` a and Dutta’s or our approach, respectively, to Moulin’s results on implemen-
tation under prudent behavior (cf. [15]) is clariﬁed in Section 7. Finally we conclude
with indicating possible lines for further research.
2 Notation
Let A = {a1,...,a m} be the ﬁnite set of alternatives. Let I = {1,...,n} be the ﬁnite
set of individuals. P denotes the set of linear orderings on A, called preferences. Pn is
the set of preference proﬁles, a typical element of which is π =( P1,...,P n).
For P ∈Pand r ∈{ 1,...,m},w ed e n o t et h erth ranking worst alternative in P by
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.
Note that br(P)=tm−r+1(P)a n dtk(P)=bm−k+1(P). Also we deﬁne the l-bottom
B(l,P)={br(P) | r ≤ l},a n dt h el-top T(l,P)={tk(P) | k ≤ l}.
Given a preference proﬁle π =( P1,...,P n) an agent i ∈ I,a n dap r e f e r e n c ePi ∈P,w e
write P−i for the preferences in π of all agents other than i,a n dπ/P 
i for the preference
proﬁle obtained by replacing Pi in π by P  
i, leaving the other preferences unchanged. So
we have P−i =( P1,...,P i−1,P i+1,...,P n), π =( Pi,P −i), and π/P 
i =( P  
i,P −i).
2Actually, they use only three axioms, one of which is the conjunction of two more basic requirements.
Instead of reproducing this structure we followed the advice of an anonymous referee, and diﬀerentiate
four conditions thereby getting a clearer view on the diﬀerences between their result and ours.4 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f : Pn → A. Given any SCF f, Pi ∈P ,
and x ∈ A we deﬁne gf(x,Pi)={P−i ∈P n−1 | f(P−i,P i)=x}.
Deﬁnition 1 Let i ∈ I, Pi,P 
i ∈P ,a n dY ⊆ A. The preferences Pi and P  
i are
Y -equivalent for i under f iﬀ for all a ∈ Y we have gf(a,Pi)=gf(a,P  
i).
Pi,P 
i ∈Pare called equivalent under f, denoted Pi ∼f P  
i if they are A-equivalent
under f.
3 Demanding Equilibrium
Agents facing a situation in which they lack information on others’ preferences could
employ very diﬀerent strategic behavior. The protective equilibrium of [3] describes the
case that agents are extremely prudent in their behavior. Here we deal with another
extreme case. Agents use a lexicographic maxmax behavior. They aim to maximize
the chance of their most preferred alternative to be the solution. Formally, this idea is
captured in the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2 Let f be a given SCF. For i ∈ I with preference Pi, a strategy ˆ Pi domi-


















The set of undominated strategies is :
Df(Pi)=




i df(Pi) ¯ Pi
 
.
First, it is useful to note that the dominance relation is transitive.
Proposition 3 For all i ∈ I, for all Pi ∈P, and for all SCFs f, the dominance relation
df(Pi) is transitive. Hence, Df(Pi)  = ∅∀ Pi ∈P.
The proof follows directly from the deﬁnition of the dominance relation.
Deﬁnition 4 Let π ∈P n. A strategy proﬁle ¯ π ∈P n is called a demanding equilibrium
with respect to the SCF f iﬀ ¯ Pi ∈ Df(Pi) for all i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 5 AS C Ff is self implementable in demanding equilibrium (s.i.d.e.)i ﬀ
for all pairs of preference proﬁles π and ¯ π, f(π)=f(¯ π) whenever ¯ π is a demanding
equilibrium with respect to f under π.
Our main goal in this section is to prove the analogue of Theorem 1 of Barber` aa n d
Dutta [3] for our concept of demanding equilibrium. To prepare for this we ﬁrst state
a series of lemmata concerning properties of the dominance relation df(Pi)a n dt h es e t
Df(Pi) for SCFs that are s.i.d.e..
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Lemma 6 Let f be s.i.d.e. Let ˆ Pi, ˜ Pi ∈Pwith ˆ Pi  ∼f ˜ Pi.T h e nDf( ˆ Pi) ∩ Df( ˜ Pi)=∅.
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose there were ¯ Pi ∈ Df( ˆ Pi)∩Df( ˜ Pi). Since ˆ Pi  ∼f ˜ Pi,t h e r e
exists P−i ∈P n−1 such that a  = f( ˆ Pi,P −i) but a = f( ˜ Pi,P −i), or a = f( ˆ Pi,P −i) but
a  = f( ˜ Pi,P −i). Assume the ﬁrst case holds. Let ¯ P−i ∈P n−1 be such that ¯ Pk ∈ Df(Pk),
for all k  = i.S i n c e¯ Pi ∈ Df( ˆ Pi)a n df is s.i.d.e., we have f( ˆ Pi,P −i)=f( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i);
also f( ˜ Pi,P −i)=f( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i) because ¯ Pi ∈ Df( ˜ Pi)a n df is s.i.d.e. This results in the
contradiction a  = f( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i)a n da = f( ¯ Pi, ¯ P−i).
The second case leads to a contradiction in exactly the same way.  
The next lemma is is the analogue of (b) in Barber` a and Dutta’s proof.
Lemma 7 Let f be s.i.d.e. For all Pi ∈Pwe have Pi ∈ Df(Pi).
Proof of Lemma 7: Suppose there were P 0
i such that P 0
i  ∈ Df(P 0
i ). Then there is
P 1
i ∈ Df(P 0
i ) such that P 1
i df(P 0
i )P 0
i (here transitivity of the dominance relation enters).
This means that there exists P 0
−i ∈P n−1, and an alternative a ∈ A, such that
















i and P 1
i are not equivalent, Claim 6 yields P 1
i  ∈ Df(P 1
i ). Therefore we can
iterate the above argument to construct a sequence P 0
i ,P1
i ,P2
i ,...of elements in P such
that, for all t ∈ N, P t
i  ∈ Df(P t








equivalent (actually even such that they are equal). P T
i ∈ Df(P
T−1





i ), P T
i ∼f P
T+S
i , and Claim 8 yield P T
i ∈ Df(P
T+S−1







i ) ∩ Df(P
T+S−1




i .T h i s
argument can be repeated to arrive at the conclusion that, in particular, P 0
i ∼f P S
i .
Now consider a sequence {P 0
−i,P1
−i,...,PS
−i} of elements in Pn−1 such that, for all t ∈
{1,...,S}, and for all j  = i, P t
j ∈ Df(P
t−1
j ). Such a sequence exists, since Df(Pk)  = ∅,
for all k and all Pk ∈P.
Equation (1), π1 ∈ Df(π0), and the fact that f is s.i.d.e. imply









This and equation (3) yield













and the fact that f is s.i.d.e. imply
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This and equation (3) yield





and so on. Finally,






















But equations (8) and (9) contradict P 0
i ∼f P S
i .  
We continue with two observations which are not made explicit in the original proof by
[3] but are used there implicitly.
Lemma 8 Let f be s.i.d.e. Let ˆ Pi, ˜ Pi ∈Pwith ˆ Pi ∼f ˜ Pi.T h e n ,f o ra l lPi ∈P, we have
ˆ Pi ∈ Df(Pi) ⇔ ˜ Pi ∈ Df(Pi).
This lemma states that for any Pi ∈Pthe set Df(Pi) is the union of equivalence classes
of preferences. The proof follows directly from the deﬁnitions.
Lemma 9 Let f be s.i.d.e. For any Pi ∈P , ˆ Pi ∈ Df(Pi) and ˜ Pi ∈ Df(Pi) implies
ˆ Pi ∼f ˜ Pi.
This means that for any Pi ∈Pany two elements in Df(Pi) are equivalent. So Claims
8 and 9 together say that each Df(Pi) is exactly one equivalence class. (Recall that
Df(Pi)  = ∅, for all Pi ∈P.)
Proof of Claim 9: Let ˜ Pi ∈ Df( ˆ Pi) for some ˆ Pi ∈P . We will show that ˜ Pi ∼f ˆ Pi.
Take any P−i ∈P n−1.S i n c ePj ∈ Df(Pj), for all j  = i by Lemma 7, and f is s.i.d.e. we
have f( ˆ Pi,P −i)=f( ˜ Pi,P −i) .H e n c ew eh a v ef( ˆ Pi,P −i)=f( ˜ Pi,P −i), for all P−i ∈P n−1,
which means ˆ Pi ∼f ˜ Pi.  
Now we are ready for this section’s main result which tells us, that if a social choice
function is s.i.d.e., to tell the truth is at least as good as any other strategy when the
criterion for individual i is given by the dominance relation df(Pi). So whenever we
can implement in demanding equilibrium we can assume that agents report their true
preference.
Theorem 10 A social choice function f is self implementable via demanding equilib-






Proof If the condition on Df(Pi) is satisﬁed, f is obviously s.i.d.e.
On the other hand, let f be s.i.d.e. Then we know from Lemma 7 that Pi ∈ Df(Pi)a n d
by Lemma 9 ˜ Pi ∼f Pi for any ˜ Pi ∈ Df(Pi).
This closes the proof of Theorem 10.   
We close this section with a another lemma about properties of the dominance relation
that will be used later on in the proof of Theorem 19.Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 7
Lemma 11 Let f be a SCF that is s.i.d.e.. Let Pi,P 
i ∈Psuch that Pi  ∼f P  
i.T h e n
Pidf(Pi)P  
i (and also P  
idf(P  
i)Pi,o fc o u r s e ) .
Proof of Lemma 11: If Pi  ∼f P  
i and f is s.i.d.e., it follows from follows from
Theorem 10 that P  
i  ∈ Df(Pi). So there must be a preference P 1
i ∈Psuch that
P 1
i df(Pi)P  
i. Now there are two possibilities: Either, P 1
i ∼f Pi, in which case we would
have Pidf(Pi)P  
i,o rP 1
i  ∈ Df(Pi). In the latter case we ﬁnd P 2
i ∈Pwith P 2
i df(Pi)P 1
i .
Continuing with the same argument we must arrive at some l for which P l
i ∼f Pi because
P is ﬁnite. So Pi ∼f P l
idf(Pi)P l−1df(Pi)...d f(Pi)P  
i and hence by the deﬁnition of ∼f
and the transitivity of the dominance relation we have Pidf(Pi)P  
i.  
4 Characterization Result
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the implementation of a social choice function
in Nash equilibrium is Muller and Satterthwaite’s [16] strong positive association. This
condition reads.
Deﬁnition 12 AS C Ff satisﬁes strong positive association (SPA) if for all i ∈ I,f o r
all π ∈P n,a n df o ra l lP  
i ∈Pthe following implication holds.
[a = f(π) and (aPib ⇒ aP
 
ib) ∀b ∈ A] ⇒ a = f(π/P
 
i).
Barber` a and Dutta present the following three conditions which together are equivalent
to SPA.
Deﬁnition 13 AS C Ff satisﬁes monotonicity (MON) if for all i ∈ I, for all π ∈P n,
and for all P  
i ∈Pthe following implication holds.
a = f(π) ,
Pi and P
 
i agree on A\{a} ,
(aPib ⇒ aP
 




⇒ a = f(π/P
 
i).
Deﬁnition 14 AS C Ff satisﬁes top-invariance (TI) if for all i ∈ I, for all π ∈P n,
and for all P  














Deﬁnition 15 AS C Ff satisﬁes bottom-invariance (BI) if for all i ∈ I, for all π ∈P n,
and for all P  
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Proposition 16 For all social choice functions, SPA is equivalent to the conjunction
of MON, TI and BI.
The proof is immediate from the deﬁnitions.
To charakterize social choice functions that are d.i.p.e. Barber` a and Dutta [3] keep
monotonicity and top-invariance, the conjunction of which they term upper strong pos-
itive association (USPA), and replace bottom-invariance by two conditions which are
weaker, namely lower conditional independence (LCI) and bottom equivalence (BE).
We will instead stick to monotonicity and bottom-invariance, which we will continue to
consider as two seperate conditions, and replace top-invariance by two weaker conditions,
which are as follows.
Deﬁnition 17 AS C Ff satisﬁes upper conditional independence (UCI) if for all i ∈ I,
and for all Pi,P 














This condition states that some reshuﬄing is also possible in T(k,Pi) without changing
the status of tk+1(Pi). However, the admissible P  
is are severely constrained: they should
be equivalent to Pi for every alternative in T(k,Pi), have the same top, and agree with
Pi on A\T(k,Pi).
Deﬁnition 18 AS C Ff satisﬁes top equivalence (TE) if for all i ∈ I,a n df o ra l l
Pi,P 
i ∈P, the following implication holds.
Pi and P
 
i are T(k,Pi)-b u tn o tT(k+1,P i)-equivalent
Pi and P
 





A consequence of TE is that Pi and P  
i have exactly the same bottom (A\T(k,Pi)). They
might diﬀer on the ranking of the T(k,Pi), but this changes won’t alter whether or not
any of the alternatives in T(k,Pi) are picked by the social choice function, irrespective
of the preferences of other agents. It will only have some inﬂuence on whether tk+1(Pi)
is the socially chosen alternative or not.
Theorem 19 AS C Ff is self implementable in demanding equilibrium iﬀ it satisﬁes
M O N ,B I ,U C I ,a n dT E .
Proof We will ﬁrst show that all four conditions are necessary for self implementability
in demanding equilibrium.
Claim 20 If a SCF f is s.i.d.e., it satisﬁes MON.Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 9
Proof of Claim 20: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose f fails to satisfy MON
but is s.i.d.e.. Then there exist i ∈ I, π ∈P n,a n dP  
i ∈Psuch that
a = f(π), (10)
Pi and P
 
i agree on A\{a}, (11)
(aP i b ⇐ aP
 
ib) ∀b ∈ A (12)
and a  = a
  = f(π/P
 
i). (13)
So obviously Pi  ∼f P  
i from equations (10) and (13) and thus by Lemma 11 Pidf(Pi)P  
i
and P  
idf(P  
i)Pi.
As we have Pidf(Pi)P  




















Let k ∈{ 1,...,m} be such that tk(Pi)=a. Then we know from equations (11) and
(12), that there is ¯ k<ksuch that t¯ k(P  
i)=a.
For s<¯ k we have ts(Pi)=ts(P  
i), so it cannot be the case that l<¯ k because otherwise
we would get a contradiction to P  
idf(P  
i)Pi. But we know from equations (10) and (13)
that gf
 









which again contradicts P  
idf(P  
i)Pi.  
Claim 21 If a SCF f is s.i.d.e., it satisﬁes BI.
Proof of Claim 21: Again, the proof is by contradiction. Suppose f fails to satisfy
BI but is s.i.d.e.. Then there exist i ∈ I, π ∈P n, P  







i agree on T(k,Pi), (16)
and tk(Pi)  = a
  = f(π/P
 
i). (17)
So we know that Pi  ∼f P  
i and hence by Lemma 11 Pidf(Pi)P  
i and P  
idf(P  
i)Pi.T h e




















If l were less than k, there would be a contradiction to P  
idf(P  
i)Pi since Pi and P  
i
























leading to a contradiction of P  
idf(P  
i)Pi.  
Claim 22 If a SCF f is s.i.d.e., it satisﬁes UCI.10 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
Proof of Claim 22: Suppose that f violates UCI. Then there exist π ∈P n, i ∈ I and
P  
i ∈Psuch that tk+1(Pi)=f(π), T(k,Pi)=T(k,P 
i), Pi and P  
i are T(k,Pi)-equivalent
and agree on A\T(k,Pi), but tk+1(Pi)  = f(π/P 
i). As P  
i and Pi are T(k,Pi)-equivalent,
and tk+1(Pi)=f(π) while tk+1(Pi)  = f(π/P 
i), it can’t be that P  
idf(P  
i)Pi.T h u s ,
Pi ∈ Df(P  
i), which contradicts the fact that Df(P  
i) is the class of strategies equivalent
to P  
i.  
Claim 23 If a SCF f is s.i.d.e., it satisﬁes TE.




i are T(k,Pi)-equivalent (18)
Pi and P
 
i are not T(k +1 ,P i)-equivalent (19)
Pi and P
 
i agree on A\T(k,Pi) (20)
and T(k,Pi)  = T(k,P
 
i). (21)
Let x = tk+1(Pi). (20) and (21) imply that x ∈ T(k,P 
i). Since Pi and P  
i are not
x-equivalent there are two possibilities :
Case 1. There exists P  
−i ∈P n−1 such that x = f(Pi,P 
−i)a n dx  = f(P  
i,P star
−i ). Let
x = tl(P  
i). Pi and P  
i are T(l − 1,P i)-equivalent by (18). Then, Pi ∈ Df(P  
i), which
contradicts the fact that f is s.i.d.e. as Pi and P  
i are not equivalent.
Case 2. There exists P   
−i ∈P n−1 such that x = f(P  
i,P  
−i)a n dx  = f(Pi,P  
−i). As Pi
and P  
i are T(k,Pi)-equivalent, it cannot be that Pidf(Pi)P  
i and P  
i ∈ Df(Pi), which is
a contradiction.
Thus, in either case f is not s.i.d.e. and TE is necessary for s.i.d.e. This concludes the
necessity part.  
Let us now consider a SCF f which satisﬁes MON, BI, UCI and TE. We shall prove
that f is s.i.d.e. More precisely, for any two non-equivalent strategies Pi and P  
i,w e
shall prove that Pidf(Pi)P  
i.T h u s ,Df(Pi) the set of non dominated strategies is the set
of strategies that are equivalent to Pi, and for any π  ∈ Df(π), f(π)=f(π ).
Suppose Pi and P  
i are not equivalent. Let tk(Pi) be such that Pi and P  
i are T(k−1,P i)-
equivalent, but are not {tk(Pi)}-equivalent. Thus, we have for some P−i ∈P n−1
tk(Pi)=f(Pi,P −i)a n d tk(Pi)  = f(P
 
i,P −i)o r ( 2 2 )
tk(Pi)  = f(Pi,P −i)a n d tk(Pi)=f(P
 
i,P −i) (23)
or both for diﬀerent proﬁles. As the second case is in contradiction with the fact that f
is s.i.d.e., we shall demonstrate that it cannot happen by showing that the assumption
that (23) holds leads to a contradiction.
Now, construct P  
i such that :










i agree on A\T(k − 1,P i). (26)Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 11
Since f satisﬁes BI, any reshuﬄing of the alternatives below x ∈ T(k − 1,P i) keeps the
status of x unchanged. Thus, by (24) and (25), Pi and P  
i are T(k − 1,P i)-equivalent.
Thus, P  
i and P  
i are also T(k − 1,P i)-equivalent and T(k − 1,P 
i )-equivalent. Since P  
i
and P  
i are T(k − 1,P 
i )-equivalent and agree on A\T(k − 1,P 
i), by TE, either we get
(a) P  
i and P  
i are not {tk(P  
i )}-equivalent and T(k−1,P 
i)=T(k−1,P 
i )=T(k−1,P i)
or (b) P  
i and P  
i are {tk(P  
i)}-equivalent.
Case (a). P  
i and P  
i share the same top and are perfectly identical on A\T(k − 1,P 
i ).
Consider now the proﬁles in gf(tk(P  
i ),P 
i ). Since T(k − 1,P 
i )=T(k − 1,P 
i), P  
i and
P  
i are T(k − 1,P 
i )-equivalent and agree on A\T(k − 1,P 





i). As tk(P  
i )=tk(P  
i), by using the same argument for P  
i,w eg e tt h a t
gf(tk(P  
i ),P 
i )=gf(tk(P  
i ),P 
i). This contradicts the fact that P  
i and P  
i are not
{tk(P  
i )}-equivalent and case (b) holds.
Case (b). P  
i and P  
i are {tk(P  
i )}-equivalent. Using the same argument as in case
(a), we can prove that P  
i and P  
i are {tk+1(P  
i )}-equivalent, {tk+2(P  
i )}-equivalent, etc.
Thus P  
i and P  
i are equivalent. By construction, we have tk(Pi)=tl(P  
i ), with l>k .
Consider now the initial proﬁle for which tk(Pi)  = f(Pi,P −i)a n dtk(Pi)=f(P  
i,P −i).
Thus tk(Pi)=f(P  
i ,P −i), and using MON, tk(Pi) ∈ φ(Pi,P −i). This is in contradiction
with (23), and only (22) is compatible with MON, BI, UCI and TE. Thus, Pidf(Pi)P  
i.
  
5 Independence of the Axioms
We present a list of examples to show that the axioms MON, BI, TE and UCI are
logically independent. We ﬁrst show that none of the four axioms is redundant, i.e.
implied by the other three.
Example 1 (A rule satisfying MON, BI and TE but not UCI) Let I = {1,...,n},
with n ≥ 2,a n dA = {a1,...,a m},w i t hm ≥ 4.L e tQ ∈Pbe the ordering a3a4 ...a ma2a1.
Deﬁne f1 by the following rule.
f1(π)=
 
a1 if a1P1a2 or P1 = Q
a2 otherwise.
Proof Since the outcome is determined by individual 1’s preferences alone, we only
need to check the properties for changes in 1’s preference.
f1 satisﬁes MON. If f1(π)=a1 we have P1 = Q or a1P1a2. So for any preference P  
1
in which a1 has moved up, we have a1P  
1a2 and hence f (π/P 
1)=a1.I ff1(π)=a2 we
must have a2P1a1 and P1  = Q. This will still hold when a2 moves up in 1’s preference,
so a2 remains chosen.
f1 satisﬁes BI. In the case P1 = Q, the chosen alternative is a1 and this is at the bottom,
so no reshuﬄing is possible. In all other cases, what matters is the relative position of
a1 and a2 in 1’s preference which will not be changed by reshuﬄing below the chosen
alternative.12 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
f1 satisﬁes TE. Consider P1 and P  
1 wich are T(k,P1)- but not T(k+1,P 1)-equivalent for
some k ∈{ 1,...,m} and agree on A\T(k,P1). All preferences in P are {a3,a 4,...,a m}-
equivalent since none of these alternatives is ever chosen. If a1 or a2 are in T(k,P1), P1
and P  
1 would be equivalent. So a1,a 2 ∈ A\T(k,P1). Indeed one of a1 and a2 has to be
tk+1(P1) and since both P1 and P  
1 agree on A\T(k,P1) the other one must be ranked
below in both. P1 cannot be Q because then there would be no P  
1 with the required
properties. So in both cases the alternative which is tk+1(P1) is chosen.
f1 violates UCI. Consider P1 = a4a3a2a1 and P  
1 = Q = a3a4a2a1.T h e n f(π)=a2 =
t3(P1), T(2,P 1)={a3,a 4} = T(2,P 
1), P1 and P  
1 are {a3,a 4}-equivalent and agree on
A\{a3,a 4} = {a1,a 2} but f(π/P 
1)=a1.
 
Example 2 (A rule satisfying MON, BI and UCI but not TE) Let m ≥ 3 and
n ≥ 2. Deﬁne f2 as follows.
f2(π)=
 
a2 if T(1,P i)=a2 ∀i ∈ I,
a1 otherwise.
Proof f1 satisﬁes MON. This is obvious, since a2 is chosen if and only if it is every-
body’s top choice. In this case it cannot be moved further up, while in all other cases
a1 is chosen and a2 cannot become the top choice by moving a1 up.
f1 satisﬁes BI. Again this is trivial. Reshuﬄing bottoms will not change whether or not
a2 is at the top.
f1 satisﬁes UCI. Consider Pi and P  
i such that f2(π)=tk+1(Pi), T(k,Pi)=T(k,P 
i)=T,
Pi and P  
i are T-equivalent and agree on A\T. tk+1(Pi)m u s tb ea1.I fa2 is not in T,
obviously f2(π/P 
i)=a1.B u ti fa2 ∈ T, T-equivalence of Pi and P  
i tells us that either it
is the top choice according to both preferences or it is not the top for both. In the latter
case, clearly f2(π/P 
i)=a1 because of P  
i; but in the former we know from f2(π)=a1
that also f2(P−i,P 
i)=a1, this time because a2 cannot be everybody else’s top choice.
f1 violates TE. Consider Pi = a3a2 ...and P  
i = a2a3 ....B o t ha r eT(1,P i)-equivalent
(since a3 is never selected) but not T(2,P i)-equivalent. They agree on A \ T(1,P i) but
T(1,P i)  = T(1,P 
i).  
Example 3 (A rule satisfying BI, TE and UCI but not MON) Let m ≥ 3 and
n ≥ 2.L e tS1(aj)=
 
 {i ∈ I
 
  aj ∈ T(1,P i)}
 
  Then,
aj = f3(π) ⇔
 
S1(aj) <S 1(ak)∀ak ∈ A \{ aj} or
S1(aj) ≤ S1(ak)∀ak ∈ A \{ aj} and S1(aj)=S1(ak) ⇒ j<k .
So eﬀectively this rule selects the alternative that does worst in terms of plurality scores,
using the smallest index as a tie-breaking rule.
Proof f1 satisﬁes BI. This is obvious because reshuﬄing below any alternative will
not change the top alternative and hence the scores S1 remain unchanged.Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 13
f1 satisﬁes TE. This property is trivially satisﬁed since the condition one needs to ckeck
is never satisﬁed. The reason is that for two preferences Pi and P  
i to be T(k,Pi)-
equivalent, they need to have the same top, in which case they are equivalent.
f1 satisﬁes UCI. If Pi and P  
i are T-equivalent, they have the same top and hence
f3(P−i,P i)=f3(P−i,P 
i) irrespective of P−i.
f1 violates MON. Consider a situation where a1 is chosen because it is tied for the least
score with some other alternative. Then there must be some individual not having a1
at the top. By moving it up to the top in this individuals preference, then, a1 will no
longer be chosen by f3.  
Example 4 (A rule satisfying MON, TE and UCI but not BI) Let m ≥ 3 and
n ≥ 2.L e tS2(aj)=
 
 {i ∈ I
 
  aj ∈ T(2,P i)}
 
  Then,
aj = f4(π) ⇔
 
S2(aj) >S 2(ak)∀ak ∈ A \{ aj} or
S2(aj) ≥ S2(ak)∀ak ∈ A \{ aj} and S2(aj)=S2(ak) ⇒ j<k .
Here an alternative scores if it belongs to the top two alternatives of an individual. The
highest score wins and ties are broken using the smallest index.
Proof f1 satisﬁes MON. This is obvious, since by moving any alternative up in any-
body’s ranking its score cannot decrease.
f1 satisﬁes TE. This property is trivially satisﬁed since the condition on preferences
that needs to be checked can never be satisﬁed. If preferences Pi and P  
i are T(k,Pi)-
equivalent it follows that T(2,P i)=T(2,P i). Otherwise there would be two alternatives
one getting one point with Pi and zero with P  
i while this is reversed for the other. This
fact could be used to make one of the two alternatives a winner under preference Pi
or P  
i while something from T(k,Pi) wins under the other preference. Hence T(k,Pi)-
equivalence implies equivalence.
f1 satisﬁes UCI. As we have seen Pi and P  
i being T(k,Pi)-equivalent implies Pi ∼f4 P  
i.
Therefore what is chosen with Pi will also be chosen with P  
i.
f1 violates BI. Consider P1 = a2a3a1 and P  
1 = P2 = a2a1a3.T h e nw eh a v ef4(P1,P 2)=
a2 but f4(P  
1,P 2)=a1.  
Next we demonstrate that each of the four axioms can be satisﬁed in the absence of the
remaining three, i.e., violation of any triple of axioms does not imply the fourth one to
be violated as well.
Example 5 (A rule satisfying TE but neither MON, BI nor UCI) Let m ≥ 5
and n ≥ 3. Consider an ordering Q = a1a2 ...a m. Deﬁne f5 by the following rule. If
T(2,P 1)=T(2,Q) and both preferences agree on T(2,Q), then apply f4 to the preference
P2 restricted to A\T(2,P 1).3 In all other cases, apply f4 to the preference P3 restricted
to A\T(2,P 1).
3Strictly speaking, we only deﬁne all social choice functions for at least two individuals. This is,
because to deﬁne equivalence, for example, we need others’ preferences. For those rules, like f4, that
only depend on one individuals preferences, however, there is no problem to also extend them to the
case of n =1 .14 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
Proof f1 satisﬁes TE. Since f4 satisﬁes TE (see Example 4) TE is clearly satisﬁed
unless we consider changes in 1’s preferences, i.e. pairs of preferences P1 and P  
1.T h e r e
are several cases to be checked. The interesting thing to look at is the set of the two top
ranked alternatives, where a1 and a2 play a special role, because they are in the top of
Q. So we need to distinguish whether they are both included in the top two, just one of
them, or none. For P1 the ranking within the top two matters (because it is equivalence
with respect to T(k,P1) that we need to ckeck), while for P  
1 the ranking among the top
two makes a diﬀerence if and only if T(2,P 
1)={a1,a 2}. All possibilities are given in
the following table, where the numbers refer to the list of diﬀerent reasons why TE is











a1a2 1.(a) 2. 3. 4. 4.
a2a1 2. 1.(b) 4. 3. 4.
a1a3 3. 3. 1.(b) 4. 4.
a3a1 4. 4. 1.(b) 3. 3.
a2a2 3. 3. 4. 1.(b) 4.
a3a2 4. 4. 3. 1.(b) 3.
a3a4 4. 4. 3. 3. 1.(b)
a4a3 4. 4. 4. 4. 1.(b)
TE is satisﬁed for the following reasons according to which case applies.
1. (a) f5(P1,P −1)=f5(P  
1,P −1) because both are determined by P2 using f4.T h e r e -
fore P1 and P  
1 are equivalent, so TE cannot be checked.
(b) f5(P1,P −1)=f5(P  
1,P −1) because both are determined by P3 using f4.T h e r e -
fore P1 and P  
1 are equivalent, so TE cannot be checked.
2. P1 and P  
1 are T(2,P 1)- but not T(3,P 1)- equivalent and T(2,P 1)=T(2,P 
1), hence
TE is satisﬁed.
3. P1 and P  
1 are T(1,P 1)- but not T(2,P 1)- equivalent but they do not agree on
A \ T(1,P 1), so TE cannot be checked.
4. P1 and P  
1 are not T(1,P 1)-equivalent, so TE cannot be checked.
f1 violates MON. Consider preferences P1 = P2 = P3 = a1a2a3a4a5 and P  
1 = a1a3a2a4a5.
Then f5(P1,P 2,P 3)=a3 b e c a u s et h i si sc h o s e na c c o r d i n gt of4 applied to P2 restricted
on A\T(2,P 1)={a3,a 4,a 5}. a3 moves up from P1 to P  
1 the rest remaining unchanged.
But now f5(P  
1,P 2,P 3)=a2 since now f4 is applied using P3 restricted on the set
A \ T(2,P 
1)={a2,a 4,a 5}.Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 15
f1 violates BI. Consider P1 = Q, P2 = a1a2a4a5a3, P  
2 = a1a2a4a3a5 and P3 arbitrary.
Then f5(P1,P 2,P 3)=a4 (use f4 with P2 on {a3,a 4,a 5}). We get P  
2 from P2 by reshuf-
ﬂing below a4, but f5(P1,P 
2,P 3)=a3 (because now a3 has moved up and wins because
of the tie-breaking rule of f4).
f1 violates UCI. Consider preferences P1 = a1a2a3a4a5, P  
1 = a2a1a3a4a5, P2 = a1a2a3a4a5
and P3 = a1a2a4a5a3.T h e nf5(P1,P 2,P 3)=a3 = t3(P1). T(2,P 1)=T(2,P 
1)=T, P1
and P  
1 are T- equivalent and agree on A \ T, but f5(P  
1,P 2,P 3)=a4.  
Example 6 (A rule satisfying MON but neither BI, TE nor UCI) Let m ≥ 5
and n ≥ 2. Deﬁne f6 as always choosing a3 unless a1P1a2 and a4P2a5,i nw h i c hc a s ea4
is chosen.
Proof f1 satisﬁes MON. Moving a3 up (or down, for that matter) never changes any
of the relevant conditions, so if a3 is chosen it will still be chosen after any monotonic
change of preferences. If a4 is chosen we have a1P1a2 and a4P2a5 and this will not be
changed by moving up a4 leaving the ranking of other alternatives unchanged.
f1 violates BI. Consider P1 = a1a2 ..., P2 = a3a5a4 ...,a n dP  
2 = a3a4a5 ... Then
f6(P1,P 2)=a3.W eg e tP  
2 by reshuﬄing 2’s preference below a3 but f6(P1,P 
2)=a4.
f1 violates TE. Consider P1 = a1,a 2 ..., P2 = a5a4a3 ...,a n dP  
2 = a4a5a3 ... P 2
and P  
2 are T(1,P 2)- but not T(2,P 2)-equivalent and agree on A \ T(1,P 2). However,
T(1,P 2)  = T(1,P 
2).
f1 violates UCI. Consider P1 = a2a1a3 ..., P  
1 = a1a2a3 ...,a n dP2 = a4a5 ... f 6(P1,P 2)=
a3 = t3(P1), T(2,P 1)=T(2,P 
1)=T, P1 and P  
1 are T-equivalent and agree on A \ T
but f6(P  
1,P 2)=a4.  
Example 7 (A rule satisfying BI but neither MON, TE nor UCI) Let m ≥ 4
and n ≥ 2. Deﬁne f7 as always choosing a3 unless P1 = a1a2a3 ..., P1 = a1a3 ...,o r
P1 = a3 ...,i nw h i c hc a s ea4 is chosen.
Proof Since f7 depends on 1’s preferences, only, we just need to consider possible
changes in the ﬁrst individual’s preferences.
f1 satisﬁes BI. This is quite clear. Either P1 has one of the three forms that lead to a4
being chosen which will not be changed by reshuﬄing below a4,o rt h i si sn o tt h ec a s e ,
a3 is chosen, and reshuﬄing below a3 never leads to the ﬁrst case.
f1 violates MON. Consider P1 = a4a3 ..., P  
1 = a3a4 ... a1nd arbitrary other prefer-
ences. Obviously f7(π)=a3, a3 has moved up from P1 to P  
1, the ranking of all other
alternatives remaining unchanged, but f7(π/P 
1)=a4.
f1 violates TE. Consider P1 = a1a2a3 ...and P  
1 = a2a3 ... P 1 and P  
1 are T(2,P 1)- but
not T(3,P 1)-equivalent and agree on A \ T(2,P 1) but T(2,P 1)  = T(2,P 
1).
f1 violates UCI. Consider P1 = a1a2a3 ... and P  
1 = a2a1a3 ... We have T(2,P 1)=
T(2,P 
1)=T, P1 and P  
1 are T-equivalent and agree on A \ T but f7(π)=a4  = a3 =
f7(π/P 
1).  16 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
Example 8 (A rule satisfying UCI but neither MON, BI nor TE) Let m ≥ 4
and n ≥ 2.
f8(π)=
 
a2 if a2 ∈ B(2,P i) ∀i ∈ I
a1 otherwise.
Proof f1 satisﬁes UCI. The only two possible choices are a1 and a2.I f f8(π)=a1
there must be some i with a2  ∈ B(2,P i). Any changes in preferences other than i’s will
not change anything. Unless a1 is ranked last, any change from Pi which keeps the same
set above a1 and does not change the ranking below cannot result in a2 being in the
2-bottom. But if a1 is ranked last, Pi and P  
i have to be a2-equivalent and hence a2 must
stay higher in the ranking than the worst two. If a2 is chosen, it is in B(2,P i) for all
i. This will not be changed by any change in preferences keeping the same alternatives
being ranked above a2.
f1 violates MON. Consider P1 = P2 = a1a2a3 and P  
1 = a2a1a3.T h e nf8(P1,P 2)=a2,
a2 has moved up, the other alternatives’ ranking stays the same, but f8(P  
1,P 2)=a1.
f1 violates BI. Consider P1 = a1a2a3a4 and P  
1 = P2 = a1a3a2a4.T h e nf8(P1,P 2)=a1
and we get P  
1 by reshuﬄing below a1 but f8(P  
1,P 2)=a2.
f1 violates TE. Consider P1 = a3a4a2a1 and P  
1 = a3a2a4a1. P1 and P  
1 are T(2,P 1)- but
not T(3,P 1)-equivalent and they agree on A \ T(2,P 1) but T(2,P 1)  = T(2,P 
1).  
6 Some Side Social Choice Functions
In the previous sections, we described necessary and suﬃcient conditions for self imple-
mentation via demanding equilibria. We here check whether some famous voting rules
are s.i.d.e. or not, and describe many s.i.d.e. SCF’s. This section adds to the results
obtained by Barber` a and Dutta [4], who describe which rules are d.i.p.e.
6.1 Scoring rules
A scoring rule is characterized by a scoring vector w =( w1,...,w m) ∈ Rm. The rank
of alternative a in preference Pi, denoted by r(Pi,a), is deﬁned by:
r(Pi,a)=k ⇔ tk(Pi)=a





For any w, we can deﬁne the scoring rule fw as selecting the alternative with the highest





[Sw(π,aj) >S w(π,ak) ∀ak ∈ A \{ aj} ]o r
[Sw(π,aj) ≥ Sw(π,ak) ∀ak ∈ A \{ aj}
and Sw(π,aj)=Sw(π,ak) ⇒ j<k . ]Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 17
Table 1: Proﬁle π1
P1 : a1 P1 a3 P1 a4 P1 ... a s P1 a2 P1 as+1 P1 ... P 1 am
P2 : am P2 a1 P2 a3 P2 ... a s−1 P2 as P2 a2 P2 ... P 1 am−1
P3 : am−1 P3 am P3 a1 P3 ... a s−2 P3 as−1 P3 as P3 ... P 3 am−2
. . .
. . .
Pm : a3 P4 a4 P4 a5 P4 ... a 2 P4 as+1 p4 as+2 P4 ... P 4 a1
Of course, the natural way to use scoring rules is to assume that wr ≥ wr+1 for r =
1,...,m− 1a n dw1 >w m. Without loss of generality, we can also assume that w1 =1
and wm = 0. Nevertheless, Smith [25] and Young [28] give characterizations of the
scoring rules without these assumptions.
The three most famous scoring rules are the plurality rule, which selects as a social
choice the alternative with the greatest number of ﬁrst place votes (w =( 1 ,0,...,0)),
the antiplurality rule where each voter awards one point to any alternative except to
the last ranked in her preference ordering ( w =( 1 ,...,1,0)), and the Borda count,
which assigns (m − 1) to a candidate each time she appears ﬁrst in one’s preference
ordering, (m − 2) points each time she appears second, and so on down to zero point
each time she appears last ( w =( m − 1,m− 2,...,1,0) or w =( 1 , m−2
m−1,..., 1
m−1,0) in
an equivalent way). The constant scoring rule assigns the same number of points to any
rank.
Theorem 24 Let m ≥ 3. The only non constant scoring rule which is s.i.d.e. for any
population size is the plurality rule.
Claim 25 A scoring rule satisﬁes BI if and only if wr = b ∀r =2 ,...,m.
Proof of Claim 25: If w1 = b, we get the constant SCF that always selects a1,a n d
it trivialy satisﬁes BI. Whenever w =( a,b,...b), any change in the preferences below
the winner does not aﬀect any score.
Now, let us assume that wr >w s for r>1a n ds>1. Consider the proﬁle π1 with m
voters, displayed on Table 1.
Each alternative ﬁlls each position once and only once, and a2 is ranked sth when a1 is
ranked ﬁrst. Thus, all the alternatives get the same score and fw(π1)=a1 according to
the tie breaking rule. Consider now the preference P  
1,i nw h i c ha2 changes its position
with tr(P1)i nP1, everything else being unchanged. Thus,
Sw(π1/P
 
1,a 2)=Sw(π1,a 2)+wr − ws >S w(π1,a 2)
Clearly a2 obtains the highest score alone, and fw(π1/P  
1)=a2, which contradicts BI.  
Proof of Theorem 24: A scoring rule satisﬁes BI iﬀ w =( a,b,...b). It is non
constant whenever a  = b.I fb>a , the scoring rule cannot be monotonic; indeed, it is18 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
Table 2: Proﬁle π2
P1 : a1 P1 a2 P1 a3
P2 : a3 P2 a1 P2 a2
P3 : a2 P3 a3 P3 a1
equivalent to f3 and selects the alternative with the smallest plurality score. So, only
the case a>bis left. This rule is equivalent to the plurality rule, w =( 1 ,0,...,0). The
strategies equivalent to Pi are the preferences P  
i such as T(1,P i)=T(1,P 
i). So, MON,
BI, UCI and TE are satisﬁed and the plurality rule is the only non constant s.i.d.e.
scoring rule.  
6.2 Condorcet Social Choice Functions
The Condorcet criterion is one of the most famous normative condition in social choice
literature. It asserts that a candidate should be elected each time she gathers a majority
of votes against any opponent in pairwise comparisons. We propose here a slightly
weakened version of this requirement.
Deﬁnition 26 Let A be a set of alternatives, I the set of voters and π ∈P n.T h e n ,
the alternative a dominates the alternative b for the proﬁle π, denoted by aM(π)b if:
#{i ∈ I
 
  aPib} > #{i ∈ I
 
  bPia}




  bM(π)a for no b ∈ A \{ a}.}
Deﬁnition 27 f is a Condorcet Social Choice Function (CSCF) if:
∀π ∈P
n,C W (π)  = ∅⇒f(π) ⊂ CW(π).
Theorem 28 If m ≥ 3, any CSCF f violates BI, except for the case m =3 ,n=4 .
Proof of Theorem 28: Consider ﬁrst the case m =3 ,n = 3, and the proﬁle π2
displayed on Table 2. We get a1M(π2)a2, a2M(π2)a3, a3M(π2)a1,a n dCW(π2)=∅.
Assume that f(π2)=a1. By BI, a change in the preferences below a1 should not aﬀect
its status. Consider P  
1 = a1 P  
1 a3 P  
1 a2. Then, f(π2/P  
1)=a3 = CW(π2/P  
i), which
contradicts BI. The same reasoning holds if we assume f(π2)=a2 or f(π2)=a3.W e
can generalize the reasoning to m>3 by adding the alternatives a4, a5, etc... below a3,
a1 and a2 in the proﬁle π2. We can also generalize to n>4, building a cycle similar to
the one proposed in π1.F o rn =4 ,m ≥ 4, we can check that BI is not satisﬁed from
the proﬁle π3:
For n =4 ,m =3 ,CW(π)  = ∅. Thus, any alternative in CW(π) stays in this set when
we aﬀect the preferences below her.  Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 19
Table 3: Proﬁle π3
P1 : a1 P1 a2 P1 a3 P1 a4
P2 : a4 P2 a1 P2 a2 P2 a3
P2 : a3 P3 a4 P3 a1 P3 a2
P3 : a2 P4 a3 P4 a4 P4 a1
6.3 Other s.i.d.e. Voting Rules
We identiﬁed two s.i.d.e. voting rules: the constant SCF and the plurality rule. Nev-
ertheless, we can design more s.i.d.e. rules. First, any rule based upon the plurality
scores will be s.i.d.e., as long as it is monotonic. This condition rules out f3 and any
process that eliminates the alternatives progressively on the basis of the plurality scores
(Smith [25] proves that such rules, called scoring run-oﬀs, are not monotonic), but keeps
all the voting procedures that use the plurality scores with thresholds. For example, we
can decide to apply the plurality rule, unless a1 already gets 20% of the total vote, in
which case she is directly elected. For more on voting rules with thresholds, see Saari
[20]. We can also attribute diﬀerent weights to the voters when they cast their plurality
vote, the extreme case being dictatorship. Using a tie breaking rule on the set of Pareto
alternatives or on the set of alternatives which are ranked ﬁrst by at least one voter
would also lead to a s.i.d.e. SCF.
7 Protective Behavior versus Prudence, Demanding
Behavior versus Risk Loving
The result we obtained for the plurality rule can be compared to the ones Barber` aa n d
Dutta [4] get for the antiplurality rule: on one hand, the plurality rule is the only s.i.d.e.
scoring rule, and on the other hand, the antiplurality rule is the only d.i.p.e. scoring
rule. In other words, when voters are extremely prudent, asking them to reveal their
last ranked alternative is a good and simple way to avoid manipulation and when voters
have an exaggerated preference for their top choice, asking them to report it will also
avoid strategic behavior.
This typology has to be compared with some results of Moulin [15], who proposes a
diﬀerent way to model risk aversion, the prudent behavior. In the process of selecting her
optimal strategies, a prudent voter will consider the number of proﬁles which lead to the
selection of an outcome, i.e. the cardinality of the sets gf(a,Pi), rather than searching
for inclusion relationships among these sets. Formally, for i ∈ I with preference Pi,a


















, ∀r<k .20 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
As noted by Barber` a and Dutta, the prudent behavior assumes implicitly that all the
preferences proﬁles π−i ∈P n−1 are equally likely. On the contrary, the demanding
or the protective behavior are applicable even if agents have no subjective probability
distribution about others’ strategies.
Using the same assumption as Moulin on the likelihood of proﬁles, we can deﬁne in a
similar way a “risk loving” or “admiriting ” behavior, by only considering the cardinal-
ities of the sets gf(a,Pi). For i ∈ I with preference Pi, a strategy ˆ Pi is risky iﬀ there


















For a SCF f and a preference Pi, the set of risky strategies is denoted by Rf(Pi), and
the set of prudent strategies is denoted by Pf(Pi).
Deﬁnition 29 Let π ∈P n. A strategy proﬁle ¯ π ∈P n is called a prudent equilibrium
with respect to the SCF f iﬀ ¯ Pi ∈ Pf(Pi), for all i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 30 AS C Ff is self implementable with a prudent behavior iﬀ for all pairs
of preference proﬁles π and ¯ π, f(π)=f(¯ π) whenever ¯ π is a prudent equilibrium with
respect to f under π.
Deﬁnition 31 Let π ∈P n. A strategy proﬁle ¯ π ∈P n is called a risky equilibrium with
respect to the SCF f,i ﬀ ¯ Pi ∈ Rf(Pi), for all i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 32 AS C Ff is self implementable with a risky behavior iﬀ for all pairs of
preference proﬁles π and ¯ π, f(π)=f(¯ π) whenever ¯ π is a risky equilibrium with respect
to f under π.
While the protective behavior (resp. demanding behavior) clearly isolates the antiplu-
rality rule (resp. plurality rule) among the scoring rules, Moulin [15] states that both
plurality rule and Borda count are implementable with a prudent behavior, but leaves
the proof to the reader. In fact, the next proposition extends his comments.
Proposition 33 Both plurality and antiplurality rules are self implementable with a
prudent behavior and with a risky behavior as soon as n ≥ 2.
Proof of Proposition 33: We handle the plurality case, the antiplurality case
being symmetric. First, it is obvious that the plurality rule is implementable with a
risky behavior, as the inclusion relationships between sets gf(a,Pi) lead to dominance
in terms of cardinality.
We propose a detailed proof of the fact that the plurality is also prudent in the case
m = 3; one can extend the arguments to m>4, tough the number of cases to analyzeImplementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 21
increases rapidly. Let A = {a,b,c} and use the alphabetical order to break ties. We
partition Pn−1 in 7 subsets:
J1 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,a) >S 1(π−i,b) and
 
 S1(π−i,a) >S 1(π−i,c)}
J2 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,b) >S 1(π−i,a) and
 
 S1(π−i,b) >S 1(π−i,c)}
J3 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,c) >S 1(π−i,a) and
 
 S1(π−i,c) >S 1(π−i,b)}
J4 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,a)=S1(π−i,b) >S 1(π−i,c)}
J5 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,a)=S1(π−i,c) >S 1(π−i,b)}
J6 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,b)=S1(π−i,c) >S 1(π−i,a)}
J7 = {π−i ∈P n−1  
 S1(π−i,a)=S1(π−i,b)=S1(π−i,c)}
The scoring rules are anonymous and neutral when we don’t use tie breaking rules4:a l l
the individual have the same power, and all the alternatives are equally treated. Thus,
#J1 =# J2 =# J3 and #J4 =# J5 =# J6. J1, J2 and J3 are non empty as soon as
n ≥ 2, J4, J5 and J6 for n =3a n dn ≥ 5, and J7 exists only if n =3 k +1 ,k ∈ N.
There are only three possible strategies for the plurality rule: Pa = aPbPc or aPcPb,
Pb = bPaPcorbPaPcand Pc = cPaPb or cPbPa.
Assume that Pi = aPbPc. We want to identify ﬁrst the strategies that minimize the
number of proﬁles such that c is selected. Clearly, Pc is not a prudent strategy as using
it instead of Pa will lead to the selection of c instead of a for all the proﬁles in J5 and
J7 and for some proﬁles in J3 and J6. Using Pb instead of Pa is useful in J3 each time
S1(π−i,c)=S1(π−i,b)+1>S 1(π−i,a). By neutrality and anonimity, there is an equal
number of proﬁles in J3 where S1(π−i,c)=S1(π−i,a)+1>S 1(π−i,b), in which cases
f(π−i/Pa)=a and f(π−i/Pb)=c.T h u s ,Pa and Pb are equivalent in order to avoid the
selection of c. Secondly, we want to minimize the number of cases where b is selected;
Pa and Pb are the only left strategies. Clearly, Pa does better than Pb in J2. Voting for
a is a prudent strategy. Similar conclusions can be raised for the other preference types;
this concludes the proof.  
So, why is the plurality prudent, but not d.i.p.e. ? At some point in the proof, Pb
is the only strategy that can avoid the selection of c. So we cannot neither state that
gf(c,Pb) ⊂ gf(c,Pa), nor gf(c,Pb) ⊂ gf(c,Pa)! A protective voter cannot choose between
Pb and Pa, while a prudent voter can use a cardinility argument to eliminate Pb from
her set of admissible strategy. This subtle diﬀerence explains the diﬀerent results we
get for the implementation of the plurality rule and the antiplurality rule.
8 Concluding Remarks
As we have already remarked in the introduction, the concept of self implementation
asks for a given social choice function which behavioral assumptions on the agents are
4For precise statements of these conditions and these results for social choice correspondences and
social welfare functions, see Smith [25] and Young [28].22 Vincent Merlin and J¨ org Naeve
compatible with the SCF in the sense that for any proﬁle of individual characteristics ev-
erybody behaving strategically in accordance with that assumption leads to the outcome
prescribed by the social choice function for that proﬁle. Of course, generally there will
be more than one such behavioral assumption. The plurality rule, for example, is self
implementable if we assume demanding behavior (Theorem 24) and also if we assume
prudent or risky behavior (Proposition 33). This is in the same ﬂavor as the concept of
double implementation (cf. Maskin [12]) and should be seen as good news: even if we do
not know exactly how individuals behave we have a whole list of behavioral assumptions
for which we are conﬁdent that the SCF under consideration will work. And even if the
plurality is not implementable for some behavioral assumption, it is of interest to ﬁnd
the domain of proﬁles under which it is implementable. For example, Lepelley and Mbih
[11] examined its vulnerability to coalitional manipulations, and Dhillon and Lockwood
[7] proposes condition under which the plurality game is dominance solvable.
One may say that these good news even sound better if among the tenable behav-
ior assumptions are two that seem to cover two extreme positions, as prudent versus
risky behavior do. Nevertheless, in the last section, we stressed a diﬀerent perspective:
Knowing which type of behavior leads to self implementability of a SCF enhances our
understanding of the SCF by telling us in which environments it may or may not be
suitable. In this sense it becomes more important to consider behavioral assumptions
discriminating between diﬀerent SCFs. It is in this respect that the protective ver-
sus demanding behavior fares better than prudent versus risky because the former pair
drives a clear cut edge between the antiplurality rule and the plurality rule, respectively,
each of them in fact signaling out exactly one from the set of all scoring rules. ¿From
an axiomatic point of view, it would be also interesting in further reasearch to derive
original characterization of the plurality and anti-plurality rules respectively based upon
BI and TI.
Even though we hope we gave a complete picture of the relationships among the diﬀerent
concepts of risky and prudent behavior we can model for the implementation of SCFs,
we did not tackled this issues for the case of social choice correspondence, i.e. when
the choice set can be multivalued. A preliminary paper [13] proves that it is easy
to adapt the deﬁnitions of section 2 and 3 and the proofs of section 4 and 5 to the
case of correspondences. Unfortunately, the simple transposition of the Barber` aa n d
Dutta technique to the correspondence case, although possible, leads to consequence
that are not convincing in term of interpretation: the behavior of the agents implicitly
deﬁnes an ordering of the subsets of alternative which does not ﬁt with a risk loving
behavior (see Merlin and Naeve [13] for details). Given these observation, the logical
nest step would be to explecitly introduce ranking on subsets induced by the agent’s
rankings on alternative in a way that is compatible with the demanding behavior we
want to model. We feel that the natural candidate would be the lexicographic maximax
extension characterized by Pattanaik an Peleg [18].Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria 23
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